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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellate Case No. 20090850

Plaintif(7Appellee,
v.
PAUL R. PRAWITT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to decide
the appeal is Utah Code Ann. Section 78A-4- 103(e). A jury found Paul R. Prawitt guilty
of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, driving on a suspended license,
driving on alcohol restrictions and open container on July 1, 2009. Judge Kevin K. Allen
sentenced him on October 19, 2009.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Is there a violation of due process in that the defendant has been deprived of his
right to meaningful appellant review?
STANDARD OF REVIEW. "Due process challenges are questions of law that we
review applying a correction of error standard. West Valley City v. Roberts, 1999 UT

App 358,16,993 P.2d 252 citing Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23.28
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
2. Did the jury instruction on refusal of breath and chemical tests shift the burden
of proof to the defendant.
STANDARD OF REVIEW. The propriety of a jury instruction presents a question
of law, which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Fisher. 972 P.2d 90,99 (Utah Ct. App.
1998).
3. Did the court err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress?
The court reviews the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for correctness,
without deference to the trial court's application of the law to the facts. State v. Baker.
2008 UT App 115, 182P.3d935.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Const, art VIII §land Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12, as set forth
in the Addendum, are relevant to a determination of this appeal.
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT THE ISSUE WAS PRESERVED
IN THE TRIAL COURT
Issue 1: The defendant did not preserve this in the trial court because the defendant
was not aware that the trial court was not adequately recording the proceedings.
Issue 2: This issue was preserved in the trial court, however, since the trial court
did not properly record the proceedings no record of the preservation is available.
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Issue 3: "And your Honor, while the jury's out just in the interest of time, I am
going to also make a motion at this point, in light of the new evidence, Fm going to make
a motion to suppress the evidence. The officer has provided new evidence today that he
didn't in fact test the keys prior to arresting Mr. Prawitt. He did not have probable cause
to believe that he was in actual physical control of the vehicle, because he didn't know
where the keys were or what keys there were." R. 276. Tr. p. 113-114.
"He just testified that he arrested him before he had any knowledge of the keys and
he said that these keys are what has led him to believe he was in actual physical control of
the vehicle, or at least one significant factor. So, we're going to move to suppress, based
on the new evidence that has just been brought to light right here right now." R. 276. Tr.
p. 114.
"THE COURT: Overruled." R. 276. Tr. p. 114.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
An information was filed against Paul R. Prawitt (Prawitt) on . R. 1. A jury trial
was held on July 1, 2009. R.276. Tr. p. 1. The jury found Prawitt guilty on all counts.
This appeal is taken from that conviction and the sentence imposed on October 10,2009.
R.254.
II. Statement of the Facts
On or about July 27, 2007 at about 2:30 a.m., Officer Toscano was on duty for
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Smithfield City. R. 276. Tr. p. 82-83. Officer Toscano noticed a vehicle parked legal on
the side of the road, with a leg hanging out the window. R. 276. Tr. p. 84. Officer
Toscano parked behind the vehicle and approached the vehicle on foot. R. 276. Tr. p. 84.
The person in the vehicle had laid the seat back and was laid back with his foot hanging
out the window. R. 276. Tr. p. 84. The windows were down and the car engine was off.
R. 276. Tr. p. 85. The headlights were not on. R. 276. Tr. p. 85.
Officer Toscano then tried to make contact with the individual by knocking on the
door and then yelling "Smithfield police". R. 276. Tr. p. 85. At trial officer Toscano
testified that as he stood by the window he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage.
R. 276. Tr. p. 85-86.
Officer Toscano then returned to his vehicle and called for back up. R. 276. Tr. p.
86. In response to officer Toscano's request Officer Karren and Officer Honeycutt
responded to the scene. R. 276. Tr. p. 86.
The officers then approached the vehicle and Prawitt was awakened from his
sleep. R. 276. Tr. p. 86. Officer Toscano asked Prawitt to step out of the vehicle. R.
276. Tr. p. 87. The officer asked Mr. Prawitt for identification and the name on the I.D.
was Paul Prawitt. R. 276. Tr. p. 88. The officer initially testified that Prawitt used the car
for balance. R. 276. Tr. p. 89. However, after playing the video, the officer stated that
"you can't see in the video, but I believe it's his left hand. R. 276. Tr. p. 131. In any
event there was some dispute between the officer's testimony and what actually occurred
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on the video. "Q. And you're-okay. Let's -is he using the vehicle for balance there? A.
No." R. 276. Tr. p. 132.
During cross-examination the officer testified that he did not see the keys in the
ignition, that he did not see the keys in Prawitt's hand, that Prawitt did not have the keys
in his pocket and at no time did the officer see the keys in Prawitt's possession. R. 276.
Tr. p. 124.
At this point Officer Toscano asked Prawitt to perform field sobriety tests. R. 276.
Tr. p. 90. After Officer Toscano had Prawitt perform the field sobriety tests, Officer
Toscano formed an opinion that Prawitt was not able to safely operate a vehicle and he
arrested Prawitt. R. 276. Tr. p. 104.
After Prawitt was arrested he was taken to the North Park Police Department. R.
276. Tr. p. 108. At the police department Prawitt was read an admonition and requested
to take an intoxilyzer test. R. 276. Tr. p. 109. After being read the admonition Prawitt
refused to take the test. R. 276. Tr. p. 109.
On July 1, 2009, a jury trial was held for the purpose of prosecuting Prawitt. R.
276. Tr. p. 1. During the trial the court had discussions with counsel regarding jury
instructions, challenges for cause in voir dire and other issues. Many of these discussions
were not properly recorded.
One critical part of the trial that was not recorded was the interview with several
potential jurors and any challenges for cause that occurred off the record.
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THE COURT: And - - and you'd have a problem - - well - MR. WALSH: Your Honor, can we just take him back to chambers and talk to him
about this?
THE COURT: Yeah. That would be - - that would be fine. Let's - - I'm just going
to have you all stay here, okay, instead of excuse you and have you come back and just try
to make it go a little bit more efficiently.
So, Mr. McGrue, if you would just go with the bailiff and we'll go in chambers.
Court is in recess.
(Recess). R. 276. Tr. p. 48.
There is no record of challenges for cause during the voir dire process. There is no
record during the time that the attorneys discussed jury instructions with the court. In
addition, the record was not preserved during other times that the court discussed other
issues in his chambers.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1) Prawitt asserts that his Due process rights have been violated because he has
been deprived of his right to meaningful appellant review, because the court failed to
record significant portions of his trial proceedings.
2) Prawitt asserts that the jury instruction on refusal or breath and chemical tests
shifted the burden of proof to the defendant and therefore was improper.
3) Prawitt asserts that his arrest was unlawful because at the time of the arrest there
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was not probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed. When the court
denied the motion he did not state a reason or make findings of fact or conclusions of law
and therefore the matter must be remanded to the trial court for further hearings.
ARGUMENT I
PRAWITT ASSERTS THAT HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS HAVE BEEN
VIOLATED BECAUSE HE HAS BEEN DEPRIVED OF HIS RIGHT TO
MEANINGFUL APPELLANT REVIEW, BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO
RECORD SIGNIFICANT PORTIONS OF HIS TRIAL PROCEEDINGS.
RULE
District Courts are courts of record under the Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art.
VIII, § I.
Due process "requires that there be a record adequate to review specific
claims of error already raised." State v. Russell 917 P.2d 557. 559
Utah Ct App. 1996) (Footnate omitted). However, we do not presume
error simply because a record is incomplete or unavailable. See id. at 560
(holding defendant not "unqualifiedly entitled to a complete record");
State v Morello. 927 P.2d 646. 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding no
presumption of "error simply because record is unavailable") Rather,
lack of an adequate record constitutes a basis for remand and a new
hearing only where: (1) the absence or incompleteness of the record
prejudices the appellant; (2) the record cannot be satisfactorily
reconstructed (i.e., by affidavits or other documentary evidence);
and (3) the appellant timely requests the relevant portion of the record.
See Russell 917 P.2d at 558-59 & n. 1: Morello. 927 P.2d at 649:
Littlefield v. Stated 14 N.M. 390. 839 P.2d 134, 138-39
(N.M.CtApp. 1992): see also Emig v. Havward 703 P.2d 1043. 1048-49
(Utah 1985) (requiring timely request for transcript or appellant assumes
risk of loss); Department of Community Affairs v. Utah Merit Sys. Council
614 P.2d 1259.1261 (Utah 1980) (although record was deficient due to loss
7

of witness's testimony, resulting from tape recorder malfunction, affidavits
cured defect); Tolman, 818 P.2d at 27-28 n. 5 (Stating while minor omissions
in transcript may be inconsequential or may be corrected through affidavits,
numerous omissions from transcript constitute grounds for new hearing).
West Valley City v. Roberts. 1999 UT App 358, 993 P.2d 252.
ANALYSIS
The absence of the record prejudices Prawitt in at least three ways: First, Prawitt
objected to some of the potential jurors and requested that they be removed for cause.
Without a full record Prawitt cannot properly argue and the appellate court cannot
properly evaluate the basis for Prawitt's objections.
The record that was preserved shows at least the following: that Prawitt tried to
object to some of the jurors and a section of the recorded is missing.
"THE COURT: Mr. Ayres?
MR. Ayres: Yeah.
THE COURT: would you and counsel approach?"
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held at side bar.) R. 276. Tr. p. 43.
"THE COURT: All right."
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held at the side bar.) R. 276. Tr. p.
45.
"Each of them have four that they get to choose from and so they're going to go
ahead and do that; although I do want to talk to counsel one second before we come up before we begin."

(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held at side bar.) R. 276. Tr. p. 47.
"So, Mr. McGrue, if you would just go with the bailiff and we'll go in chambers.
Court is in recess."
(Recess) R. 276. Tr. p. 48.
"MR. AYRES: Your Honor, if we could approach ?
THE COURT: Sure."
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held at side bar.) R. 276. Tr. p. 52.
"Counsel, will you please approach?"
(Whereupon, an off-the-record discussion was held at side bar.) R. 276. Tr. p. 52.
All the discussions in chambers with potential jurors were held off the record. In
addition, challenges to jurors for cause were held off record.
The court then allowed Prawitt's counsel to make a record regarding one of his
objects, which was to juror Colt Giles. However, Mr. Ayres indicated that he had other
objects. "MR. AYRES: And your Honor, just for the record, we accept the jury subject to
all the objections. Technically, I guess V ve got to say that." R. 276. Tr. p. 56-57.
Without a full record it is not probable to determine what the other objections were
that Mr. Ayres made to the selection of the jury panel.
Second, the entire discussion regarding jury instructions was held in the judges
chambers and the record was not preserved. Mr. Ayres, Prawitt's attorney objected to
several instructions including instruction number 5.
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Third, a juror on the jury had to be excused for inappropriate conduct. The whole
discussion with the attorneys and with the juror was in the judges chambers and off the
record. However, the Court spoke to this issue later on the record. "For the record,
related to me, Mr. Ayres, that on the way up in the elevator, Mr. Call had - - which was
one of the jurors, had contacted him and asked him some questions, which the Court
interpreted as a negative connotation towards Mr. Call. Mr. Call did not - - or not Mr.
Call, Mr. Ayres, or at least what Mr. Ayres does.
And so, although Mr. Ayres did not make the motion, on my own accord, I have
dismissed Mr. Callfromthe jury, which would mean that Ralph Baer, No. 9, is now a full
juror. Okay?" R. 276. Tr. p. 95.
Although the court summarized the issue a proper recording was not made
concerning all the discussions between the judge, the attorneys and the juror.
The court's failure to properly record the jury trial has created a situation which
has denied Prawitt proper appellate review and therefore his due process rights have been
violated. Wherefore, Prawitt requests that this matter be remanded to the trial court for a
new trial.
ARGUMENT II
THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON REFUSAL OF BREATH AND CHEMICAL
TESTS SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE DEFENDANT.
Prawitt asserts that Jury Instruction No. 5 was improper. Jury Instruction No. 5
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states, "A person operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state is
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, or under the influence of alcohol, any drug or combination of alcohol and any
drug.
If an officer requests such a test, a person may refuse to take the test and
potentially suffer certain adverse legal consequences as a result of that refusal namely, the
revocation of the person's license to operate a motor vehicle."
Prawitt asserts that this jury instruction improperly shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant. In support of his claim, Prawitt, relies on two cases, State v. Bales, 675
P.2d 573 (Utah 1983) and Orem City v. Longoria, 186 P.3d 958, 2008 UT App 168, a
memorandum decision.
Bales, was a Utah Supreme Court case that struck down language in a jury
instruction that expressly imposed a presumption of guilt against the defendant for fleeing
the police. State v. Bales, at 574-76. The language of the jury instruction in Bales,
stated, C4you are further instructed that flight affords a basis for an inferences of
consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission impermissibly infringed on
the defendant's presumption of innocense)." However, in Bales, the court also instructed
the jury on the challenged instruction that they were permitted to give whatever weight
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they determined to give the evidence.
In Orem City v. Longoria, the defendant as in the present case was charged with
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol or drugs while operating a motor vehicle. The
defendant like, Prawitt, refused to submit to breath, blood or urine test.
In Orem City v. Longoria, the district court gave the following jury instruction:
"You are instructed that under Utah law a person operating motor vehicle in this
State is considered to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood or
urine for the purpose of detemiining whether he/she was operating or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a
combination thereof.
When an officer arrests a person for [DUI], the officer may request the person
submit to a test of his breath, blood or urine to determine the person's blood or breath
alcohol level.
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to [Defendant's]
refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by the officer, just as you may
weigh and consider any evidence presented." Id. at % 3.
In Orem City, the defendant argued that the District Court had committed error
because the court had not instructed the jury on innocent reasons language. However, the
court ruled that the instruction was proper because it contained the following language,
"You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to [Defendant's]
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refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by the officer, just as you may
weigh and consider any evidence presented". Id. at f 3.
In the present matter, the jury instructions did not contain any innocent reasons
language. More importantly, instruction number 5, did not contain any language stating,
"You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to [Defendant's]
refusal to submit to the blood or breath test". Therefore, unlike the instructions in both
Bales and Orem City, the instruction in the present matter improperly shifted the burden
of proof creating a presumption of the defendant's guilt.
The defendant believes that his trial attorney objected on the record to this
instruction. However, the trial court did not preserve the record. If the court determines
that this issue was not preserved then Prawitt raises plain error. In order for there to be
plain error, "a defendant must demonstrate that (1) an error exists; (2) the error should
have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error is harmful; i.e. absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome." State v. Ross. 2007 UT
89,117, 174 P.3d 628.
In the present matter an error existed. The jury instruction was unfairly worded
placing the presumption of guilt on the defendant. The trial court should have known
about the error. The error is clearly harmful because the language of the instruction
clearly made it appear that the defendant was guilty and did not have mitigating language
such as you may give whatever weight you determine should be given to this evidence.
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ARGUMENT m
PRAWITT ASSERTS THAT HIS ARREST WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE AT
THE TIME OF THE ARREST THERE WAS NOT PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
THAT A CRIME HAD BEEN COMMITTED.
There are generally three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters between
law enforcement and the public:
"(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and pose questions so long as the
citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has
an 'articulable suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime;
however, the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop5; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed." Salt
Lake Citv v. Rav, 2000 UT App. 55, f 10, 998 P.2d 274,277 (Utah App. 2000); See State
v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
The third level is arrest, which requires probable cause for the officer to believe
that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d
1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). "Probable cause to arrest exists only when the facts
and circumstances within the officer's knowledge, and of which they have reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
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caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." United States v.
Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 896 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Probable cause does not require facts sufficient for a finding of guilt; however, it does
require more than mere suspicion." United States v. Morris. 247 F. 3d 1080, 1088 (10th
Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Probable cause is measured against an
objective standard . . . [T]he primary concern is whether a reasonable officer would have
believed that probable cause existed to arrest the defendant based on the information
possessed by the arresting officer." Valenzuela 365 F.3d at 896-97.
In the present matter there was a controversy concerning what the officers knew at
the time when he arrested Prawitt. Initially, officer Toscano wrote a report stating that
prior to arresting Prawitt they found keys which they tried in the ignition. However,
under oath he testified that his police report was incorrect.
Q. Okay. Let's talk for just a moment about that report. Officer Toscano, did you
write an absolutely perfect report on this report - - on this incident?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Did you make some errors?
A. I did.
Q. And what errors might have been?
A. My chronological placement of when Officer Karren tried the keys in the
ignition of the vehicle.
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Q. In your report, where does it indicate - - when does it indicate Officer Karren
was in the vehicle with the keys?
A. While I was doing my F.S.T.s.
Q. And have you had an opportunity to view this video?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that when Officer Karren was in the car, trying the keys?
A. No.
Q. Okay. From your observations from viewing this video again, when did that
happen?
A. That happened after the arrest and after I put Mr. Prawitt in my vehicle.
R. 276. Tr. p. 105-106.
After officer Toscano testified that the police report had been incorrect, Prawitt's
attorney made the following motion.
"And your Honor, while the jury's out, just in the interest of time, I am going to
also make a motion at this point, in light of the new evidence, Fm going to make a motion
to suppress the evidence. The officer has provided new evidence today that he didn't in
fact test the keys prior to arresting Mr. Prawitt. He did not have probable cause to believe
that he was in actual physical control of the vehicle, because he didn't even know where
the keys were or what keys there were.
He just testified that he arrested him before he had knowledge of the keys and he
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said that these keys are what has led him to believe that he was in actual physical control
of the vehicle, or at least one significant factor. So we're going to move to suppress,
based on the new evidence that has just been brought to light right here right now.
THE COURT: Overruled." R. 276. Tr. p. 113-114.
Other relevant facts that officer Tascano testified about during the trial are as
follows:.
Q. And just to be clear, at no time did you ever see Paul driving the vehicle?
A. No. I did not.
Q. At no time did you ever see him with the keys in his hands?
A. No.
Q. The keys in his pocket?
A. No.
Q. With the keys, in any way, shape or form?
A. Within his immediate area. I did not see them, but Officer Karren had told me
that the keys were center console. (As testified above this was told to Officer Toscano
after the arrest).
Q. The vehicle was parked just as a vehicle should be parked on the side of the
road; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. The automobile the- - the truck was not running at any time you saw it;
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correct?
A. No.
Q. No headlights were on?
A. No. R. 276. Tr. p. 137-138.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12, states in pertinent part as follows:
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other
than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise
permits
(b) . . . The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:...
(b)(2) motions to suppress evidence . . .
(c) . . .Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall
state its findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
In the present matter, the defendant did not raise his motion to suppress at least
five days before trial. However, the police report stated one set of facts and the police did
not admit that the facts set forth in the police report were erroneous until the day of trial.
Therefore, under the circumstances the defendant's motion to suppress was timely.
In any event the trial court did not state why he denied the motion and did not

18

make findings of fact or conclusions of law. In State v. Genovesi. 871 P.2d 547 (Utah
App. 1994), the court stated:
Although we generally grant substantial deference to the trial court's
findings of fact, we do so only when the findings" 'disclose the steps
by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'
"State v. Marshall 791 P.2d 880, 882 n. 1 (Utah APP.) (quoting Rucker
v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336.1338 (Utah 1979)1 cert, denied, 880 P.2d 1105
Utah 1990). Moreover. Utah Rule of Crminal Procedure 12(c) requires
the trial court to specify if findings on the record when resolution of
factual issues is necessary to the deposition of a motion. James. 858 P.2d
at 1014-15; Marshall 791 P.2d at 882. Since the issues presented in
search and seizures cases are highly fact sensitive, see, e.g., Lovegren.
798 P.2d at 770; Marshall 791 P.2d at 88L the findings of fact must be
sufficiently detailed to allow this court to meaningfully review the trial
court's decision. James. 858 P.2d at 1015; Lovegren. 798 P.2d 770.
In addition, the court in Genovesi. stated:
Likewise, the trial court's conclusions of law must also be sufficient to
allow for adequate appellate review. State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454.
465 (Utah App.) (requiring trial courts to record sufficient conclusions
of law on all evidence relevant to its decision in order to facilitate appellate
review), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Arroyo.
796 P.2d 684. 687 (Utah 1990) (holding that case must be reversed and
remanded when trial court's findings and conclusions are insufficient
to support trial court's findings or court of appeal's conclusions as to
consent); Marshall 791 P.2d at 889-90 (reversing and remanding for a
further hearing on the issue of consent); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972.
981 (Utah App. 1988) (reversing and remanding "for the trial court to
make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions on the issue of consent").
Turning to the present matter, the trial court made no findings of fact or
conclusions of law. The court did not even state a reason for denying the motion. Based
on the insufficiency of the record this matter should be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
First, Prawitt was denied due process of law because his trial was not properly
recorded. Second, Prawatt asserts that jury instruction number 5 was improper and it
shifted the burden of proof the defendant. Finally, Prawitt asserts that he was unlawfully
arrested because the police did not have probable cause to arrest him at the time of his
arrest. In addition, when Prawitt's motion to suppress was denied the trial court did not
make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. Wherefore, Prawitt requests that
this matter be remanded to the trial court for a new trial and other proper proceedings
such as an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress.
DATED this 2th day of April, 2010.

Bryan Sidwell
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDA

INSTRUCTION NO.

5

A person operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state is
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for
the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the
influence of alcohol, any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug.
If an officer requests such a test, a person may refuse to take the test and potentially suffer
certain adverse legal consequences as a result of that refusal namely, the revocation of the
person's license to operate a motor vehicle.

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
ART. VIII §1.
Section 1. [Judicial powers - Courts]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial court
of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as the
Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme court, the district court, and such other
courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not of record shall also be
established by statute.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other than one
made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It
shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the
relief sought. It may be supported by affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the admissibility
of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may
be raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at least five days
prior to the trial:
(b)(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other
than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection
shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding;
(b)(2) motions to suppress evidence;
(b)(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(b)(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or
(b)(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for good
cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests
which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
(e) Except injustice' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the
hearing on motions, including suchfindingsof fact and conclusions of law as are made
orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or
in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information. Nothing in this
rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.

